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This thesis identifies and analyzes labor market, econo-
mic, demographic, and geopolitical factors and trends which
are believed to be important to officer accessions.
A basic officer supply model is derived from an occupa-
tional choice model. The study specifies three different
measures of officer supply: applicaticns, new contracts, and
accessions. Log-linear regression models using these three
dependent variables are then estimated with ordinary least
squares techniques.
A basic hypothesis was that applications would be a more
accurate measure of actual manpower supply, since new
contracts and accessions are demand-constrained. The
empirical results, however, rejected this hypothesis.
Nonetheless, the results indicate that officer supply is
affected by some economic variables, in particular civilian
wages.
In a second step, the basic officer supply models are
estimated for specific officer programs such as nuclear
officers, nurses, medical officers, and the entire medical
corps. The estimated regression equations for the separate
programs were not sufficiently robust to allow accurate
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Demographic trends show a steady decline of the youth
population in the United States through 1996, followed by a
moderate increase until 2010. This population decrease is
having a major impact on the labor force. For example, it is
already affecting the military, and is expected to make
recruiting increasingly more difficult over time. Part of the
problem for the military relates to the fact that all four
branches of service must compete against each other in
recruiting high quality personnel; and, in addition, they all
are faced with intensified competition from a growing, well-
paying industry. The question of officer supply becomes more
and more important under these circumstances. This is still
true with possible troop reductions, which will result in
reduced demand for officer candidates, since the focus is on
high quality applicants with technical training.
The Navy Recruiting Command (NRC) establishes the annual
recruiting goals for all Navy officer programs, based on the
total manpower zequirements for each of these programs.
Officer recruiting is divided into over 40 separate programs,
such as nuclear, medical, minorities, etc. NRC distributes
the respective shares over the six Navy Recruiting Areas
(NRAs), and the Area commanders then assign the goals per
program to the 41 Navy Recruiting Districts (NRDs). Market
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share and recruiter share are the major factors that determine
the goal distribution. Recruiting conditions, however, are
unlikely to be equal all over the United States, and some geo-
graphic areas might fail in recruiting for some programs while
others could easily accomplish higher goals for those same
programs. Thus, establishing the right goals for each officer
program and NRA will make recruiting more effective. This
could become especially important as competition for the
supply of high quality college graduates grows and, as is
likely, zecruiting sources become increasingly scarce.
B. OBJECTIVES
To be able to set realistic goals for officer recruiting,
the Navy should have tha capability to forecast future supply
conditions by local geographic areas. The objective of this
study is to develop a supply model to predict future officer
accessions' and possible shortfalls. This requires that
political, demographic, and economic factors and trends impor-
tant to officer recruitment be identified and analyzed.
The announced troop reductions, defense budget cuts, and
the geopolitical changes in the Soviet Union and Europe will
affect both the demand of and the supply for military
personnel. Economic factors and trends, as well as demogra-
phic trends are also important for recruiting, esp Aially for
-The term "accession" refers to those recruited and
actually entering the Services.
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those programs having difficulties in meeting their recruit-
ment goals, such as minorities, medical, and nuclear officer
programs.
This thesis will attempt to collect historical data--
broken down by NRD and NRA--on accessions, recruiters, and
goals from NRC. Recruiting data will be combined with local
labor market and demographic data, in order to construct an
officer accession data base. The purpose of this data base
is to provide a cross-sectional, time series, or pooled sample
suitable for analyzing officer manpower supply.
Regressior analysis will be used to specify and estimate
officer supply models by major and specific programs. To test
the validity of the supply models, they will be used to
forecast accessions by area and program for a recent period.
The study also intends to assist in identifying new
variables that more accurately profile local area officer
supply conditions and therefore should be included in the
NRC's goal allocation model.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. A REVIEW OF OFFICER SUPPLY STUDIES
Enlisted personnel supply has been studied extensively
since the advent of the all-volunteer force in 1973. Borack
[Ref. 1:pp. 5-6] provides a good summary of past studies. 2
Studies about officer supply, on the other hand, are almost
nonexistent, perhaps because of the greater cost of meeting
enlisted accession requirements.
Snyder [Ref. 2] addresses the issue of officer recruiting
over the time period from 1970 to 1982. He looks at the
quality of applicants--in general and with respect to
geographical differences. He also examines various officer
recruiting sources to find the effects of changes in officer
recruiting methods and scientific-technical education
requirements on officer recruiting and accessions. Snyder
concludes that the quality of officers increased during this
period, and that accessions will be no problem in future
years. However, he predicts that retention will be a problem.
The underlying assumption is that officer recruiting is less
sensitive than enlisted recruiting to economic and labor
market conaitions because "the need for financial assistance
2In addition see: James N. Dertouzos, Enlistment Supply,
Recruiter Objectives, and the All-Volunteer Army, 1984; Gary
A. Nelson, "The Supply and Quality of First-Term Enlistees
under the All-Volunteer Force", The All-Volunteer Force after
a Decade, William Bowman et al., 1986.
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during college . . . exists for most families even during
economic good times" [Ref. 2:p. 413]. This is probably true,
especially in more recent years as tuition for colleges and
universities has increased rapidly. On the other hand, the
declining youth population probably forces education institu-
tions to temper any tuition increases and to be more aggres-
sive in recruiting students, which then affects officer
recruiting. [Ref. 3:p. 135]
Snyder assumes that recruiting of women and minority
officers is no longer a problem and that geographic differ-
ences in re; i._%.ing will be balanced through selection
procedures and large numbers of applicants. The determining
factor in the selection for the military academies is the
equal share of appcintments allocated to each member of
Congress. Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) scholarships
get selected in a national competition and the final selection
for officer Candidate School (OCS) is also done at the
national level. These selection procedures can provide
geographical representativeness for the specific programs.
However, these three sources are not the only commissioning
sources, and demographic changes still may have an effect upon
the geographic representativeness of officers in the future.
Data on the share of national population per region versus
the regional origination of officers in the Department of
Defense (DoD) support Snyder's assumptions for the time period
1970-1982 for the Northeast and the North Central regions, but
not for the South and the West. The differences for the
South, the West, and the Northeast are greater, comparing the
percentage of officers by origin within DoD with the share of
undergraduates by region. Table 1 shows the differences in




O R = Number of officers per regional origin
0 D = Total number of officers within the DoD
P = Population per region (P ) or
Population of undergraduates per region (P U)
P I = Total national population
If the index equals one, the representativeness is perfect.
An index above one shows that more officers are recruited from
this reqion and vice versa.
Table 1 indicates that the Ntorth Central region is close
to perfect representativeness, while the South supplies more
officers and the West is heavily underrepresented with regard
to the share of national and undergraduate population.
One explanation for these regional differences might be
the geographic distrib'ition of ROTC units, which does not
always match the respective share of the undergraduate
population. Table 2 provides the distribution of ROTC units
based on the same computation as used for the officer
representativeness.
TABLE 1
INDEX OF REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVENESS OF
OFFICERS WITHIN DOD COMPARED TO
TOTAL POPULATION AND COLLEGE UNDERGRADUATES
REGION POPULATION UNDERGRADUATES
Northeast 1.05 1.13
Nortn Central 0.97 0.98
South 1.10 1.25
West 0.82 0.66
Source: Derived from Snyder [Ref. 2:pp. 415-4183 using
e~uation 2.1.
TA3LE 2
INDEX O? REGIONAL DIPTkIBUTION OF ROTC UNITS




North Central 1.03 0.96
South 1.13 1.30
West 0.87 0.70
Source: Derived from Snyder [Ref. 2.pp. 415-4181 using
equation 2.1.
The Northeast has fewer ROTC units but ;rovides relatively
more ofticers, while the South w~th significantly more ROTC
units provides officers slightly below these ratios.
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Therefore, officer supply must be influenced by factors other
than ROTC location, which Snyder does not explore. Looking
at officer quality by accession source, he addresses polit-
ical and military policies for recruiting officers, and demo-
graphic trends, but leaves out economic conditions, which may
be of greater importance to officer recruiting and accessions
than he assumes.
Bres et al. [Ref. 4], develop an "Accession Into
Designator" (AIDS) goal programming model to determine "the
number of [Naval] officers that each commissioning source
should produce and how . . [they] should be distributed
among occupational specialties 3 " [Ref. 4:p. 1]. The AIDS
model is part of "The Structured Accession Planning System for
Officers" (STRAP-O) used by the Navy. [Ref. 5] The main
objective of this program is to evaluate the feasibility of
a desired number of officers, based on attrition, accessions,
and available officer candidates. However, the model's
"central focus is on personnel inventory and accessions
necessary to achieve" [Ref. 5:p. 2) the desired number of
officers. Thus, both models determine optimal accessions (by
source) based on the demand, but do not evaluate whether the
necessary accession supply is attainable.
3Occupational specialties are identified by designator
and grouped for planning purposes in communities such as
surface warfare, aviation, etc.
Serfass [Ref. 6] develops a preliminary officer enlistment
model. Based on previous studies about enlisted manpower
supply, he develops a forecasting model to predict Nuclear
Propulsion Officer accessions. (Ref. 6:p. 10] He uses
quarterly historical data for five years to predict the number
of contracts signed in the six Navy Recruiting Areas (NRAs)
and for the Navy Recruiting Command (NRC). The explanatory
variables included were of three types: (1) Navy/military
policies, (2) economic conditions, and (3) demographic data.
[Ref. 6:pp. 11,15)
B. A NUCLEAR PROPULSION OFFICER ENLISTMENT SUPPLY MODEL
Serfass forecasts the number of new contracts signed for
each of the six NRA's and the NRC, based on a linear model,
which is estimated using stepwise multiple regression and
ordinary least squares techniques. He examines some varia-
bles using lagged and unlagged combinations. This is done to
determine whether each explanatory variable affects the
success of recruiters contemporaneously or with a lag.
Stepwise regression is a useful method for exploratory
analysis when many independent variables are available and the
analyst has no theoretical basis for selecting among them.
However, the basic stepwise regression method does not guaran-
tee the best model or the one with the highest R-squared, nor
is there any guarantee that the developed model is an accurate
representation of the supply choices made by potential officer
candidates. [Ref. 7:p. 76?]
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Serfass includes six explanatory and three dummy variables
in his basic supply model. The stepwise regression reduces
the number of statistically significant variables included in
the final models to a range from two to five. (Ref. 6:pp. 40,
44-47] Statistical programs like SPSS or SAS provide more
sophisticated model selection methods, for example, maximum
R-squared improvement [Cef . 7:p. 765], which might have given
better results. However, since the goal in this thesis is to
predict accessions, maximum R-squared is not a useful
criterion for selecting independent variables. Instead, all
variables should be included which are generated by a labor
supply model. The stepwise regression is, therefore, not an
appropriate method with regard to the small number of included
variables.
Serfass examines the correlation between explanatory
variables with the aid of correlation coefficients and scatter
plots. He finds positive correlation between the number of
recruiters and the number of new contracts for Nuclear
Propulsion Officers and uses the correlation coefficient value
of 0.7 or higher as a critical value for omitting variables.
[Ref. 6:pp. 28-29] Although the prior literature provides no
firm answer regarding a value above which multicollinearity
is assumed to be severe, a correlation coefficient of 0.7 is
)elieved to be too high. As a result, further multicol-
linearity possibly inherent in the models is not examined.
The use of scatter plots to examine multicollinearity is also
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questionable. Simple bivariate techniques do not hold
constant the effect of other independent variables. Omitting
a variable is the simplest method to deal with problems of
multicollinearity, but it may result in specification bias and
misleading values of the estimated pa: °meters.
The models developed by Serfass account for seasonal
effects using dummy variables for quarters but no variable for
a time trend is included. As economic data usually are
influenced by time trends, a variable taking this into account
should have been included. Ash, Udis, and McNown use a time
variable in their enlistment supply model as a proxy for
systematic change in taste for military service. [Ref. 8:p.
146] For the sample period (1967-1979). the time trend is
negative for males and whites but positive for non-whites,
except for the Air Force, where it is uniformly negative.
[Ref. 8:p. 153) These results are expected because the data
cover the Vietnam war and post-war eras.
1. Explanatory Variables
a. Recruiters
During the past several years, the NRC has had
problems filling its quotas because the Navy reduced its
recruiting resources, while at the same time the other
services increased their resources. Lerro et al. point out
that it was the extraordinary effort of the recruiters which
prevented the Navy from failing to meet its goals. [Ref. 9:p.
VIII Obviously, as labor market conditions get more hostile
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toward military recruiting, the number of recruiters becomes
an increasingly important factor for meeting established
goals.
Several studies about enlisted supply include the
number of recruiters per recruiting area. This variable must
be handled with care. Based on data from time series of cross
sections, Cotterman [Ref. 10:p. 10] expects a positive
influence on enlistment through additional recruiters and
assumes no effect on enlistment by recruiters from other
services. He argues that the recruiter variable varies over
time but not in cross section, although he admits that "cross-
Service effects are a real possibility" (Ref. 10:p. 10] for
aggregate time series. Goldberg [Ref. 11:p. 11], also using
pooled time series of cross sectional data, reports positive
cross effects, when recruiters from other services are added
to a model. For all high school graduates in his estimated
Navy enlistment supply model, the elasticity of an Air Force
recruiter is as high as the one for the Navy recruiter (0.44).
(Ref. 11:p. 27) This reflects the competition between
recruiters leading to increased problems filling the quotas.
Increasing the number of recruiters may increase supply to a
certain point; but, if the ratio of recruiters to targeted
population gets smaller, the returns per recruiter diminish.
To eliminate this problem, Serfass assumes that
Dedicated Nuclear Propulsion Officer Program Recruiters (DNRs)
are the only ones recruiting for their community. [Ref. 6:p.
12
18) But this assumption does not eliminate the problem. The
targeted group is small, because the goal stresses bigh
quality applicants, in whom other Navy recruiters and other
services are interested too. Only one recruiting area shows
significant response to the number of DNRs. [Ref. 6:pp. 40,
44-47) This leads to two conclusions: first, the number of
recruiters has no effect on the actual recruitment, which is
not supported by other studies, nor is it believed to be true
under the above-mentioned labor market conditions; second,
stepwise regression erroneously eliminated the recruiter
variable, because recruiters fulfilled the goals even under
extreme circumstances.
b. Goals
The above studies do not accou.;t for changes in
the recruiter efforts with respect to given goals. Dertouzos
(Ref. 12] shows that productivity of Army recruiters for
enlisted personnel is affected by goals. Once the goals are
achieved, there might be no further incentive to produce more
recruits. (Ref. 12:pp. 6-9) Besides factors like recruiter
awards for overachievement, recruiter goals must be based on
predicted supply to assute that recruiters do not have to fear
increasing goals based on their past performance.
The NRC establishes the annual goals per commis-
sioning source, based on projected attrition and resulting
manpower requirements. These goals therefore are based on
demand. Changes in demand result in changes in actual supply,
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unless the supply curve is inelastic, which can be assumed
not to be true for officer supply. The aim of forecasting
models is to predict whether and how this demand can be
filled.
A problem arises if goals and recruiters are
thought to be simultaneously determined. They are highly
correlated in cross-sectional analysis, as shown by Borack and
Siegel as well as by Jehn and Shugart. 4 Serfass finds that
goals are statistically significant only for the entire NRC
and the number of recruiters for only one of the six areas.
[Ref. 6:pp. 44,47] If these results are correct, the question
about goal and recruiter allocation for recruiting areas and
districts would be of no further interest. Alternatively, it
may be that a different estimating technique should be used
to disentangle the effects of goals, recruiters, and
enlistments.
c. Advertising
Besides other factors, advertising might be a
major factor increasing the propensity to serve. Although the
Army's budget for advertising exceeds the other services'
budgets by many times, this does not always guarantee positive
effects on propensity, as shown by the Youth Attitude Tracking
Study. [Ref. 13] After years of decreasing propensity to
4Both studies are quoted from Goldberg [Ref. 6:p. 11].
Borack, J., and Siegel, B.S., An Econometric Model of Armed
Forces Enlistment Levels, 1976; Jehn, C., and Shugart, W.F.,
RecruitersQuotas., and the Number of Enlistment, 1976.
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join the armed forces the general tendency has been increasing
for the past six years. For 1987, the propensity data for
young males show that the Air Force and Army are above the
Navy and Marine Corps. While the percentage increase for the
Air Force and Navy were 2.2 and 1.2, respectively, there was
virtually no change in either the Marine Corps (0.2 percent
difference) or Army (-0.3 percent difference). Data for young
females show the same ranking, but the propensities are closer
together. [Ref. 13:pp. 46-51)
Serfass' argument for including "advertising
costs" is the "attempt to determine the significance of the
cost of recruitment of officers" [Ref. 6:p. 20]. This
argument is wrong because: (1) advertising expenses are only
a part of the costs of recruitmeit, and he did not examine
whether they are the major influencing part; and (2)
determining supply, it is a question of how much more can be
recruited by increasing the advertising expenses. The cost
of recruitment, for example, increases with pay raises too,
but assuming "normal"--not above market wage increases--pay
raises, this does not necessarily increase supply.
The assumption that increased advertising expenses
increase supply was reasonable, but received support in only
one of six areas. [Ref. 6:pp. 40, 44-47] This result is
contrary to a recent study by Dertouzos et al. (Ref. 14),
which indicates that advertising has an immediate effect on
Army enlisted recruiting. The study by Dertouzos et al. also
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points out that advertising might not only draw enlistees from
the civilian sector, but also negatively influences the
recruiting efforts of the other services. Although the
results reflect enlistment behavior, concluding that advertis-
ing expenditures influence officer recruiting nationwide--
perhaps less than enlistment recruiting--seems more reasonable
than Serfass' assumption.
d. Economic Factors
Models estimating enlisted personnel supply
generally include economic factors such as unemployment and
relative pay. [Ref. 11:pp. 7-8] Does this hold true for
officer supply or is officer recruiting less sensitive to
economic conditions? [Ref. 2:p. 413] Although Snyder's
assumption about the need for financial help for college
education might be true for most families, the question arises
how firms which normally do not pay for general training/edu-
cation change their attitude in spite of the decreasing youth
population, and how their offered pay for college graduates
often exceeds military pay. Individuals may be more
interested in obtaining money for education from their
civilian employer than to sign up for the military. [Ref.
9:p. VI]
In periods of low unemployment, potential appli-
cants for the military can choose from a variety of work
alternatives. As industry competes--via higher pay--for the
same pool of personnel, military recruiters will find it more
16
difficult to fill goals. Therefore, to predict future supply,
pay must be considered as an explanatory variable. It is
usually measured as the military/civilian pay ratio. However,
correlation between unemployment and pay ratio, must be
examined. As the unemployment rate falls, the absolute
difference between military and civilian pay may go up. Most
of Serfass' significant equations included unemployment, but
the pay ratio is never statistically significant. [Ref. 6:pp.
40, 44-47) The reason for these results might be the measure-
ment of the unemployment rate as a percentage of the total
labor force. Goldberg reports that he could not get reliable
measures of the youth unemployment rate for Navy Recruiting
Districts, which ould be a much more accurate measure. [Ref.
11:p. 21]
Pay elasticities in other cross-sectional studies
on Navy enlistment supply range from -0.86 to 1.26, includ-
ing one study that found no effect at all. Unemployment-
elasticities for the same studies are much smaller, ranging
from 0.02 to 0.3. (Ref. l1:p. 8] Ash et al. report positive
pay elasticities but find insignificant unrmployment elastici-
ties for the Navy. [Ref. 8 :p. 153) it is one of the only
studies tc find insignificant unemployment effects on enlisted
supply.
Dale and Gilroy commented on the study by Ash et
al. Dale and Gilroy maintain that the Ash et a8. study "failed
to find an unemployment effect on enlistments because they did
17
not have available the most appropriate data for estimating
their equations." [Ref. 15:p. 547] Other major points of
criticism are the use of semiannual data on accessions,
estimated for both draft and post-draft eras, and the
definition of the dependent variable as total male accessions
rather than contracts signed by high school graduates. [Ref.
15:p. 5473 Some seasonal fluctuation is smoothed out by using
semiarnnual data, but Dale and Gilroy show that their quarterly
data on new contracts and a respective dummy variable allow
for better accounting of seasonality.
The argument against accession data in enlisted
supply models is that they are determined by demand--and can
be regulated through the Delayed Entry Program--while new con-
tracts are determined by supply. Therefore, to estimate an
enlisted supply model, new contracts should be used as a
dependent variable. Dale and Gilroy support their argument
by shuwing the correlation of new contracts and unemployment
rates. [Ref. 15:pp. 548-549]
The question still remains whether unemployment
and relative pay are significant for officer accessions. As
mentioned before, if the variety of work alternatives is high
and the recruiting market turbulent, unemployment will tend
to have some effect on officer recruiting.
e. Demographic Factors
Demographic changes have great influence on
supply. Of primary interest for military personnel supply is
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the youth population between the ages of 18 and 24 years. The
size of this group decreases through 1996, followed by a
moderate increase until 2010. This increase is partly a
result of immigration and the rapid growth of minorities.
[Ref. 16:pp. 6-8] The Hispanic 18-to-24-year-old age group
is expected to increase between 11 and 12 percent per decade
starting in 1990. This increase corresponds to 51 percent for
the time period from 1990 to 2010, compared to a 3.9 percent
increase for the total age group population. [Ref. 17:pp. 14-
15)
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Median Scores show
lower scores for minorities than for white students (except
Asians/Pacific Americans) in all study fields. Differences
are extreme in engineering, computer science, health and
medical studies. [Ref. 18:p. 108] Recruiting in these fields
has been difficult over the past several years. Although the
market share of minorities has increased tremendously, and
will continue to do so, problems may arise for recruiting from
this reservoir. Assuming no essential change in SAT mean
scores for minorities, goals for minority accessions might
still be unattainable. As this aspect. is important for long-
range officer recruiting strategies, it must be used when
projecting potential officer supply. Therefore, explanatory
variables for the different groups of minorities have to be
included in a labor supply model.
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"Serfass looks at a very specific market and
includes demographic aspects only by calculating a market
share for nuclear officers as "proportion of the national
technical degrees . . . granted within each recruiting area
. . . to the national total" [Ref. 6:p. 24]. Including at
least a variable for racial composition of the population
would have been useful.
Serfass' market share variable is statistically
significant only for NRA 3, and he cannot reject autocorrela-
tion between market share and the three seasonality variables
significant for this Area. [Ref. 6:pp. 40, 44-47] People do
not adjust instantaneously to changes in the economy or
government policies. Therefore, it might have been better to
lag the market share variable. Serfass' argument is that
historical data for NRA 3 show a constant share of contracts,
regardless of changes in the economy or government policies.
_ [ ef. 6:p. 451
It is also questionable whether the targeted
market is correctly specified. Looking at white collar
workers and college students in technical majors includes
women who account for only a small percentage of Nuclear
Propulsion Officers. This, and the fact that the number of
women in the labor force is increasing, may have caused a




Serfass uses contracts signed per area as the depen-
dent variable. Following the argument presented by Dale and
Gilroy [Ref. 15:p. 547] regarding enlisted supply, this would
be the correct dependent variable. However, Serfass' goal is
to predict officer supply more than to explain it. Therefore,
it might have been useful to investigate applications, con-
tracts signed, and accessions to see which model explains
officer recruitment and accessions best. This thesis will
proceed along these lines and explore alternative measures of
"1suppl y.
Applications express the total available supply,
although not everyone who turns in an application shows
further interest later on or can actually enlist because
he/she may not meet the qualifications. However, in the Navy
it should be noted that applications have already been
screened. Contracts signed show the supply at a certain point
in time, but some might not enter the armed forces right away,
while others may lose interest over time. Finally, accessions
represent those who definitely join the Navy.
3. Results
The numbers of contracts for 1986, projected by Ser-
fass seldom equal the actual numbers. The percentage errors
per NRA range from 0 percent to 240 percent, and for the
entire recruiting command from 7 percent to 21 percent. [Ref.
6:p. 51] NRC recruitment goals were achieved prior to the end
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of fiscal year 1936. Serfass does not expect this to happen.
If he had included a variable for time trend, he might have
gotten some indications about likely changes in future
accessions.
One assumption to explain the poor results achieved by
Serfass is that there might have been unexpected actions like
changes in bonuses, which affected the recruiting process, but
were omitted from the model. [Ref. 6:p. 503 If this had
happened, he should have been aware of it.
The chosen model, sample size, and quality of the
historical data are also potential sources of prediction
errors as well as changes in policies and goals. Serfass does
not find changes in policies and goals, and he argues that
improvement in recruiter productivity may have caused poor
forecasting results. [Ref. 6:pp. 52-53] The conclusion about
improved recruiter productivity is concurrent with findings
by Lerro et al. regarding recruiter efforts. [Ref. 9:p. VII]
Also, Serfass' data for predicted and actual contracts signed
in 1986 show a peak in the third quarter and a sharp drop
afterwards. 5 These results indicate that there may be little
incentive for recruiters to exceed the established goals, as
Dertouzos points out. [Ref. 12:pp. 6-9]
5Serfass' study provides fourth quarter data for 1986
only for the first half of the quarter. However, the drop in
contracts signed is significant.
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Serfass' study is based on quarterly data for five
years and six recruiting Areas. The pooled cross-section
analysis, therefore, is based on a total sample size of 120
observations. However, for each individual Area, only 20
observations are available, which reduces his degrees of
freedom.
Serfass assumes a linear relationship between the
dependent variable and the explanatory variables. The litera-
ture about enlisted supply models indicates that very few
studies use linear models. Most studies use Log-linear and
Logit model specifications. The rationale behind a
logarithmic transformation involves diminishing returns to
recruiters. Diminishing returns to factor input means that
beyond a certain level of production, each additional unit of
factor input--holding all other factor inputs constant--will
lead to smaller and smaller increments in production. For
diminishing returns to scale, all factor inputs can change
simultaneously. Again, after a certain level of production,
the output becomes smaller and smaller compared to the units
of input. In officer and enlisted supply models additional
recruiters are expected to have diminishing returns.
Another useful feature of logarithmic models is that
the slope coefficients measure the responsiveness or elasti-
city of the dependent variable with respect to each indepen-
dent variable. The elasticity provides the percentage change
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in the dependent variable for a one percent change in any
independent variable.
To summarize, major criticisms about Serfass' methodo-
logy and the model specification are: (1) the use of stepwise
regression to eliminate "not significantly influencing"
variables; (2) the omitting of correlated variables; (3) the
assumption about linearity; and (4) the definitions of some
variables chosen to predict future supply.
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III. DATA SOURCES, MODEL, AND SAMPLE
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether a
supply model can be developed which would be useful in
predicting future officer accessions. Data that are used to
develop the supply model and data sources are described first.
Then, a basic officer supply model is derived from a theoret-
ical model about officer accessions, followed by an investiga-
tion of variables which should be included to improve
predictions of accessions.
A. DATA SOURCES
The Navy Recruiting Command provided historical data files
for fiscal years 1986 through 1988 on 30,802 individual
officer applications (fleet input excluded). The number of
new contracts and accessions over the same time period total
16,736 and 14,200, respectively. The data are aggregated for
each of the 41 recruiting Districts and each fiscal year for
applications, new contracts, and accessions. This provides
a pooled, time series cross-sectional data base to analyze
each of the three dependent variables--applications,
contracts, and accessions.
The data on state unemployment rates for the respective
years are obtained from the "Statistical Abstract of the
United States" for 1986, 1987 [Ref. 19), and 1988 [Ref. 17).
Wage data--at the county level--are taken from files created
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. These data are grouped
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into medical and non-medical wages to allow for separate
models for medical and non-medical officer progra•ms. Although
the medical wages probably reflect the true average earnings
for this group, the non-medical wage data are unlikely to
accurately reflect the opportunity wage for other officer
programs. It is likely that they overstate the civilian wages
for non-engineering jobs and understate the civilian wages for
engineering jobs.
The data on earned college degrees were obtained from
files created by the National Center for Educational Statis-
tics, which gathers these data every two years. The files
contain individual data per college. The aggregation of these
data to state level contains many missing values, which
reduces the sample size and the degrees of freedom for
regression analysis. Thus, aggregation to the county level
was not possible.
The military-available population data at the county level
were extracted from files prepared by Woods & Poole Economics,
Inc. The data in these files are grouped into two categories:
ages 17-21 and ages 22-29. Both groupings do not correspond
with the target youth population, 18-24, which this thesis
seeks to examine. However, it is assumed that the behavior
of the 22-29 age group is similar to the target 18-24 group,
so these data are therefore included. The data are extracted
for the total military-available population and calculated
separately for black, Hispanic, and white populations.
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Because the six NRAs do not correspond with state boun-
daries, a cross-reference file is used to merge all data.
This file allocates county- and state-level data to the
respective NRDs. Table 3 provides sample size, means, and




VARIABLES N MEAN STDEV
Applications 123 250.42 91.1
Contracts 123 136.80 55.8
Accessions 123 115.45 47.5
Unemployment Rate 123 6.62 1.9
Wage (annual $) 123 31,750 5,112
Recruiters 123 3.98 
.2
Goals 123 450.84 151.5
Pop (22-29) 123 722,987 367,411
Black Pop (22-29) 123 79,554 60,778
Hispanic Pop (22-29) 123 47,674 87,711
White Pop (22-29) 123 595,759 275,149
Degrees 114 111,279 89,886
a. Data represent a pooled cross section of 41 NRDs over
three years (1986-88)
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B. A THEORETICAL MODEL OF OFFICER ACCESSIONS
The hypotheses concerning the impact of pay on officer
accessions can be derived by applying a choice model,
following Goldberg [Ref. 11] for enlisted recruitment and,
Altman, and Barro [Ref. 20] for officer supply. To make a
choice between two occupations, a person is assumed to compare
the monetary earnings and nonmonetary benefits from both
alternatives.
Altman and Barro view the nonmonetary benefits as a
product of two components. One component has the same value
for each person, while the other might be positive or nega-
tive, depending on the individual's valuation of the bene-
fits. Altman and Barro assume that a potential applicant
decides to become an officer if the total of military monetary
and nonmonetary returns is greater than the sum of the respec-
tive returns from a civilian occupation. The authors further
assume a proportional relationship between monetary earnings
and nonmonetary benefits for each person and occupation and
define the "relative civilian/military taste factor" leading
to the "relative pay differential"' for military/civilian
earnings. (Ref. 2 0:p. 650] A relative pay differential shows
what is necessary to make someone indifferent between two
alternative occupations.
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The choice model 'cr a potential officer candidate can be
written as follows 6:
EN + B K > E C + B C ( 3.1 )
Where:
EX = military earnings
BK = nonmonetary military benefits (in money terms)
(can be positive or negative)
Ec = civilian earnings
BC = nonmonetary civilian benefits (in money terms)
(can be positive or negative)
If the military earnings E H exceed E C B C- B K,
which is called the reservation wage or supply price7, the
candidate decides to join the military:
EN > E C + B C - B (3.2)
The difference of Bc - B N represents the net taste for the
military. The pay differential EN / E , then follows from
equations 3.1 and 3.2 as:
EN / E C > 1 + (B C - BK) / Ec ( 3.3 )
This model assumes, then, that the decision to join the
military is influenced by expected civilian earnings and the
nonmonetary benefits in the civilian and military occupation.
ýThe model follows Goldberg's choice model. [Ref.
11:p.18]
7See Cooper, R., Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer
Force, Santa Monica, 1977, for a discussion about the use of
supply price versus reservation wage.
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Another argument for including pay and/or wages in a
supply model is that fast-changing technology affects military
and private industry in the same way. Both sectors have an
increasing need for technically-skilled people and compete for
them. The major advantage for private industry is its
capability to pay much higher earnings than the military But
firms normally do not provide general training and most
technical training is general in nature. The Services, on the
other hand, provide applicants with general training in return
for an obligation to serve. The choice model implies that the
majority of applicants for officer programs compares the
returns from education and obligated time with possible
earnings in the civilian (local) market; the greater the
differences, the less likely a person will be to join the
military.
The variable for wages that is included in the supply
model is separated into medical and non-medical wages. Wage
levels rather than a pay-ratio are used, because this thesis
focuses on college graduates and qualified medical personnel
such as doctors and nurses. The majority of these new
officers join the Navy with the same rank, although there are
differences between occupations such as the surface warfare
and medical communities. The assumption is that under these
circumstances the civilian wage level provides the same
information as the military-civilian pay ratio. Increases in
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civilian wages are expected to have a negative impact on
officer applications, new contracts, and accessions.
1. Unemployment
Unemployment rates are commonly used as predictors of
change in enlisted manpower supply. As mentioned before, it
is difficult to obtain data on youth unemployment rates for
specified recruiting areas. [Ref. 11:p. 21] Consequently,
state unemployment rates for all age groups are used instead.
This variable introduces some measurement errors. Young
people may be more likely to get a job, even with high
unemployment rates, than older people. However, if no data
on youth unemployment are available, the state unemployment
rates must be used as an approximation. Higher unemployment
should lead to increased supply for the military, although the
"effect might be overstated.
2. Taste for the Military
Recent announcements about troop reductions, budget
cuts, and the dramatic changes in the political environment
in the Soviet Union and Europe will affect the demaiid for and
the supply of manpower to the military.
Declining demand increases competition between those
intending to join the armed forces. By the same token, chan-
ces for applicants with lower Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT)
scores decline. As mentioned above, minorities tend to score
lower than white counterparts. [Ref. 18:p. 10C] For fiscal
year 1987, shortfalls for black officer candidates in the
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Officer Candidate School and Aviation Officer Candidate School
Program were more than 42 percent. This situation, in light
of equal opportunity, is problematic for the Navy; and, based
on 1987 data, it is assumed that the Navy needs at least up
to the end of the year 2000 to level out these differences.
[Ref. 18:pp. 113-114]
Troop reductions and a reduced threat from the Warsaw
Pact, on the other hand, may result in the following
"worst" and "best" case scenarios:
1. The intention to serve in the military decreases,
reducing the supply for officers. But, depending on the
magnitude of the decrease, this might have a severe impact on
recruiting--if the decrease is large--or might be just equal
to the decreased demand.
2. Potential officer candidates "rush" to sign up for
the military, creating a large surplus of potential officer
candidates and a large buffer in the Delayed Entry Program
(DEP). The buffer can be used in future years to fulfil the
accession goals. A disadvantage is that candidates might lose
interest in the military if their entrance is delayed over a
longer period.
The recruiting situation for minorities may not get
worse, but it definitely will not get better under these
circumstances. As the magnitude of the above changes cannot
be determined precisely at this moment, an additional problem
arises in measuring the pzopensity to serve for officer
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candidates. There is no study available which measures this
factor. The Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS), used for
enlisted supply models, provides a measurement of propensity,
but it does not include college attendees. [Ref. 13:p. 2]
It might be possible to derive a proxy by projecting YATS data
from high school seniors; but the time between being surveyed
and eligible to join the military is too long to expect
reasonable results. Those who have positive attitudes toward
the military might change their attitude over time. Including
an approximation in the supply model would probably cause
prediction errors. Instead, dummy variables for the six Navy
Recruiting Areas (NRAs) and a time trend are included to
account for unmeasured regional differences in tastes, and
changes over time in tastes for the military.
3. Demographic Factors
In addition to the decreasing proportion of youth com-
bined with the growing proportion of minorities, the composi-
tion of the labor force will change even more due to the fact
that 65 prrcent of all new job applicants in 1990 will be
women. [Ref. 16:p. 93S However, this does not mean that
women will also make up 65 percent of technical majors in
college. In fact, women tend to select non-technical majors,
a pattern also found for minorities. [Ref. 18:p. 110)
SThe percentage number is quoted in Ref. 16 from
Government statistics cited ia Anthony M. Casale, TrackinQ
Tomorrow's Trend (Kansas City: Andrews, McMeel, and Parker
1980), p. 57.
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Modern military systems have an increasing need for
officers trained in technical areas. As mentioned (in Chapter
I,BI), minorities tend to have lower SAT scores than white
students, especially in technical studies. In spite of the
declining supply of white male:., selection standards currently
emphasizing mathematical abilities disregard potential
resources and hamper equal opportunities for minorities.
Variables for racial and ethnic origin are included in the
supply model and are assumed to have a negative impact on
officer supply.
Most studies on enlisted supply are restricted to
young men, but the Navy has experienced problems in recruiting
women too. Recruiting nurses, for example, has been difficult
during recent years. Accession data for Army nurses for
fiscal year 1987 show that 53.8 percent were under 25 years
when they joined the military. (Ref. 21:p. 11] This is the
age group this thesis is examining. Thus, the basic officer
supply model includes both men and women in the population
variables.
To determine the goal share for each recruiting area,
the Navy includes the share of college degrees in the "Generic
Officer Goaling Model.." Therefore, a variable for earned
college degrees is added to the basic officer supply model.
Increased competition with private industry--especially due
to higher earnings for jobs in the industry--will probably
make recruiting from this pool more difficult. Despite this,
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the effect of the variable on officer supply is expected to
be positive.
4. Recruiters and Goals
1The number of recruiters has significant explanatory
power in prior studies on enlisted recruitment, and it is
expected that it will also have a positive impact on officer
recruitment. The effect of recruiters efforts, however, is
subject to diminishing returns (as explained in Chapter 11.3).
The variable for recruiters can be added to the supply
model with respect to each NRA or as the total number of
recruiters appointed by the NRC. Applying the number of
recruiters in each NRA might cause an upward-biased effect if
the Navy distributes disproportionately more recruiters to
fertile recruiting areas. [Ref. 1O:p. 10] Assuming that the
Navy does not change its recruiter allocation from year to
year, it might therefore be a better approach to apply the
number of recruiters per NRA than the total number on the
national level.
Established goals per recruiter are based on projented
attrition and resulting manpower requirements. These goals-
-distributed over all recruiters--direct recruiter efforts
toward specific targeted groups. Thus, recruiter efforts are
determined by goals [Ref. 12], and goals can be used to
measure recruiter productivity. Therefore, a supply model
must include goals as an explanatory variable, although they
might be highly correlated with the number of recruiters per
35
recruiting area. Higher goals are expected to lead to
increased recruitment, although with a diminishing effect.
5. Accessions, New Contracts, and Applications
The dependent variable in supply models is usually
defined as the number of accessions or the number of new
contracts. Both variables express supply for the Navy, but
reflect different situations. Accessions--those who join the
Navy at a certain point in time--are determined through
available capacities in the Naval Academy or the Officer
Candidate School, while new contracts are the result of
established recruiting goals. This thesis will use both
variables to see which dependent variable is explained better
by the model. Accessions and new contracts do not reflect the
true supply available for the Navy. The number of appli-
cants 9 , on the other hand, can be used as an approximation for
the entire available supply. A supply model should also be
estimated with respect to applications, and it is expected
that this model would differ from the above two.
6. An Econometric Model of Officer Supply
Regression analysis on a log-linear function is used
to estimate the effects of economic factors, demographic
factors, and recruiting resources on officer supply. The log-
linear functional form accounts for diminishing returns to
9Applications are only an approximation of total supply
because the Navy screens applicants before an application is
sent to the NRC.
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each variable and the estimated coefficients represent the
respective elasticities.
The basic officer supply model is given by:
SUPPLY = f ( UNEMPL, WAGE, RECRS, GOAL,
POP29, DEGREE, RACE, ETHNIC,
NRA3, NRA4, NRA5, NRA7, NRA8,
YEAR87, YEAR88 ) (3.4)
Alternatively, supply is estimated with three different
variables: APPLICATIONS, CONTRACTS, and ACCESSIONS as the
dependent variable. Base cases for the models are the
recruiting Area One (NRAI) and fiscal year 1986.





ACCESS Accessions per NRD and year
CONTRACT Contracts per NRD and year
APPLICAT Applications per NRD and year
UNEMPL Unemployment rates for civilian non-
institutional population
WAGE Market wages for medical and non-
medical employees
RECRS Recruiters per NRD
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TABLE 4 (Continued)




WH29 White population ages 22-29
HSP29 Hispanic population ages 22-29
BLK29 Black population ages 22-29
NRA3 Dummy variable equal to one for NRA3
NRA4 Dummy variable equal to one for NRA4
NRA5 Dummy variable equal to one for NRA5
NRA7 Dummy variable equal to one for NRA7
NRA8 Dummy variable equal to one for NRA8
YEAR87 Dummy variable equal to one for FY 87
YEAR88 Dummy variable equal to one for FY 88
7. Analysis
Regression models are first estimated for the total
number of applications, contracts, and accessions. Each
dependent variable is exanLined, including and excluding the
variable for college degrees. Each model is then regressed
with three different model specifications. In the first
specification, the dependent variables and the variables for
recruiters, goals, and degiees are divided by the total
military-available population. This provides a supply model
where the supply variable is adjusted for population. in the
second specification, the military-available population is
38
included as an explanatory variable. In the third specifi-
cation, the military available population for blacks,
Hispanics, and whites are included as explanatory variables.
The coefficient estimates are presented in Tables 5 through
10.
Tables 5, 6, and 7 present the ordinary least squares
regression equations, excluding the degrees variable. Only
model 1 in Table 5 and models 1 and 2 in Table 7 have the
correct signs. The estimated effects of the recruiters and
goal variables are not statistically significant for any
model.
TABLE 5
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF ALTERNATIVE
SUPPLY MODELS USING APPLICATIONSa
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3.
VARIABIJE APPLICAT APPLICAT APPRATEb
CONSTANT -1083.117 -1000.947 .349
(-1.242) (-.831) (2.659)
UNEMPL 3.137 -4.746 -. 00022
(.118) (-.167) (-.056)
WAGE -180.363 -158.202 -. 025
(-3.373) (-3.039) (-3.141)
RECRS 5.537 1.801 .003
(.068) (.021) (.287)
GOAL 108.437 110.601 .007
(.945) (.914) (.590)




BLK29 N/I 19.497 N/I
(2.417)
HSP29 N/I 4.632 N/I
(.581)
WH29 N/I 147.847 N/I
(5.407)
NRA3 35.640 36.604 .003
(.637) (.581) (.990)
NRA4 2.952 8.454 -. 002
(.067) (.181) (-.458)
NRA5 -44.908 -38.288 -0.008
(-1.293) (-1.013) (-2.005)
NRA7 -51.397 -35.422 -0.011
(-.763) (-.463) (-2.409)
NRA8 -51.658 -8.794 -. 007
(-.975) (-.217) (-1.572)
YEAR87 39.600 38.911 .001
(.772) (.720) (.248)
YEAR88 14.650 13.005 -. 005
(.187) (.158) (-.561)
NUMBER OF OBS. 123 123 123
R: - ADJUSTED .67 .68 .54
F-STATISTIC 21.732 19.468 14.032
a. T-statistic in parentheses.
b. Dependent variable and variables RECRS, and GOAL are
divided by the military-available population.
N/I z not included.
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TABLE 6
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF ALTERNATIVE
SUPPLY MODELS USING CONTRACTS&
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3.
VARIABLE CONTRACT CONTRACT CONRATib
CONSTANT -667.445 -622.884 .153
(-1.253) (-.849) (2.770)
UNEIPL 1.016 -1.465 -. 00008
(.063) (-.084) (-.035)
WAGE -110.772 -96.891 -. 014
(-3.392) (-2.094) (-2.991)
RECRS -14.466 -15.856 .002
(-.290) (.302) (.272)
GOAL 95.545 96.868 .003
(1.364) (1.314) (.464)
POP29 106.471 N/I N/I
(9.451)
BLK29 N/I 8.600 N/I
(1.749)
HSP29 N/I 4.316 N/I
(.888)
WH29 N/I 83.249 N/I
(4.995)
NRA3 27.831 31.324 .002
(.814) (.815) (1.028)
NRA4 2.055 5.899 -. 002
(.077) (.209) (-.784)
NRA5 -31.737 -27.086 -0.006
(-.480) (-1.176) (-2.626)
NRA7 -19.850 -12.351 -0.007
(-.821) (-.265) (-2.432)




YEAR87 11.894 11.743 .003
(.380) (.357) (-1.036)
YEAR88 11.424 10.970 -. 006
(.239) (.218) (-1.232)
NUMBER OF OBS. 123 123 123
R2 - ADJUSTED .67 .64 .57
F-STATISTIC 21.873 16.350 15.912
a. T-statistic in parentheses.
b. Dependent variable and variables RECRS, and GOAL are
divided by the military-available population.
N/I = not included.
TABLE 7
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF ALTERN'TIVE
SUPPLY MODELS USING ACCESSIONla
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3.
VARIABLE ACCESS ACCESS ACCRATe
CONSTANT -392.937 -226.403 .155
(-.844) (-.354) (3.170)
UNEMPL 6.230 3.938 -. 0009
(.440) (.250) (-.440)
WAGE -105.116 -102.057 -. 014
"(-3.684) (-2.476) (-3.305)
RECRS 6.413 4.933 .005
(.147) (.108) (.784)
GOAL 61.682 62.093 -. 0004
(1.007) (.966) (-.071)
POP29 89.016 N/I N/1
(9.042)




HSP29 N/I 5.050 N/I
(1.192)
WH29 N/I 65.677 N/I
(4.521)
NRA3 25.667 25.564 .002
(.859) (.763) (1.232)
NRA4 -1.404 1.566 -. 002
(-.060) (.064) (-1.016)
NRA5 -27.835 -25.947 -0.005
(-1.501) (-1.292) (-2.663)
NRA7 -17.553 -16.406 -0.006
(-.488) (-.404) (-2.378)
NRA8 -12.029 -3.294 -. 003
(-.599) (-.153) (-1.352)
YEAR87 2.681 2.362 -. 004
(.098) (.082) (-1.478)
YEAR88 -5.212 -5.877 -. 008
(-.125) (-.134) (-1.744)
NUMBER OF OBS. 123 123 123
R' - ADJUSTED .66 .62 .57
F-STATISTIC 20.312 15.254 15.982
a. T-statistic in parentheses.
b. Dependent variable and variables RECRS, and GOAL are
divided by the military-available population.
N/I = not included.
Adding college degrees to the models, the coefficient
estimates for goals and recruiters should decrease because
the three variables are related to each other. Tables 8, 9,
nd 10 show that the effect of adding college degrees to the
models is twofold. First, model 3 in column 3, which is based
on ratios, shows essentially no change in the coefficient
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estimates or in the significance levels for unemployment,
wage, recruiters, and goals. Second, for models 1 and 2 in
columns 1 and 2, the impact of goals increases--which is
exactly the opposite to what was expected--while the estimates
for unemployment, wage, and population decrease. The inter-
esting exceptions for population estimates are the coeffi-
cients for Hispanics, which increase.
Tables 8 through 10 show that the coefficient esti-
mates for the unemployment rate are always insignificant.
They are all positive only in the regressions on total acces-
sions. This result leads to the conclusion that unemployment
does not have much effect on officer supply. This was
expected, because college graduates face fewer unemployed
problems than those without a college degree. Therefore, state
level data on unemployment do not fit the population under
investigation.
TABLE 8
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF ALTERNATIVE
SUPPLY MODELS USING APPLICATIONS'
MODEL I. MODEL 2. MODEL 3.
"a !ABLA E &U1A & A-APPL _E
CONSTANT -1107.836 -905.356 .364
(-1.213) (-.714) (2.499)
UNEMPL 1.162 -3.140 -. 00054
(.041) (-.10&) (-.123)





-. 271 .003(.027) (-.003) (.256)










BLK29 N/I 17.771 N/I
(1.958)
HSP29 N/I 7.943 N/I
(.948)
WH29 N/I 1ý4.535 N/I
(4.664)
NRA3 35.253 34.986 .C03
(.617) (.537) (.908)
NRA4 1.685 7.065 















YEAR87 43.263 42.574 .102
(.805) (.745) (.354)
YEARS8 18.896 17.503 
-. 004
(.232) (.202) (-.416)
NUMBER OF OBS. 114 114 114
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TABLE 8 (Continued)
R2- ADJUSTED .69 .65 .53
F-STATISTIC 20.284 14.945 11.689
a. T-statistic in parentheses.
b. Dependent variable and variables RECRS, GOAL, and DEGREE
are divided by the military-available population.
N/I = not included.
TABLE 9
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF ALTERNATIVE
SUPPLY MODELS USING CONTRACTSa
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3.
VARIABLE CONTRACT CONTRACT CONRATEb
CONSTANT -664.535 -493.854 .149
(-1.218) (-.654) (2.352)
UNEMPL -2.446 -2.768 -. 00019
(-.145) (-.149) (-.073)
WAGE -96.142 -87.819 -. 014
(-2.723 k-1.773) (-2.648)
RECRS -19.182 -19.926 .002
(.380) (-.373) (.235)
GOAL 100.763 101.203 .004
(1.412) (1.339) (.571)
DEGREE -9.342 -10.056 -. 00051
(-3.193) (-3.085) (-1.123)
POP29 102.035 N/I N/I
(8.954)
BLK29 N/I 7.415 N/I
(1.373)
HSP29 N/I 6.976 N/I
(1.398)




NRA3 27.314 29.041 .002
(.800) (.749) (1.034)
NRA4 2.096 5.655 -. 002
(.078) (.200) (-.677)
NRA5 -26.330 -23.912 -0.006
(-1.243) (-1.041) (-2.355)
NRA7 -12.940 -11.598 -0.006
(-.313) (-.247) (-2.127)
NRA8 -22.462 -14.937 -. 004
(-.969) (-.591) (-1.391)
YEAR87 14.105 13.883 -. 003
(.439) (.408) (-.820)
YEAR88 14.680 14.267 -. 005
(.302) (.277) (-1.018)
NUMBER OF OBS. 114 114 114
R2 - ADJUSTED .70 .67 .57
F-STATISTIC 21.589 16.090 13.652
a. T-statistic in parentheses.
b. Dependent variable and variables RECRS, GOAL, and DEGREE
are divided by the military-available population.
N/I = not included.
TABLE 10
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF ALTERNATIVE
SUPPLY MODELS USING ACCESSIONS'
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3.
VARIABLE ACCCES.S ACCESS ACCRATE'
CONSTANT -361.532 -105.496 .153
(-.751) (-.159) (2.734)




WAGE -94.940 -95.270 -. 014
(-3.046) (-2.189) (-2.956)
RECRS 1.917 .850 .005
(.043) (.018) (.718)
GOAL 64.389 64.229 .0004
(1.022) (.967) (.058)
DEGREE -7.044 -7.798 -. 0004
(-2.649) (-2.723) (-.916)
POP29 85.019 N/I N/I
(8.449)
BLK29 N/I 6.747 N/I
(1.422)
HSP29 N/I 7.026 N/I
(1.603)
WH29 N/I 57.521 N/I
(3.814)
NRA3 23.670 22.318 .002
(.785) (.655) (1.185)
NRA4 -2.702 .236 -. 002
(-.115) (.010) (-.947)
NRA5 -25.218 -24.318 -0.005
(-1.348) (-1.205) (-2.449)
NRA7 -14.908 -17.936 -0.006
(-.408) (- .434) (-2.155)
NRA8 -14.189 -9.360 -. 003
(-.693) (-.421) (-1.080)
YEAR87 3.936 3.568 .004
(.139) (.119) (-1.235)




NUMBER OF OBS. 114 114 114
R2 - ADJUSTED .68 .64 .57
F-STATISTIC 19.468 14.663 13.706
a. T-statistic in parentheses.
b. Dependent variable and variables RECRS, GOAL, and DEGREE
are divided by the military-available population.
N/I = not included.
Tables 8 through 10 show that estimates for wages are
always negative and usually significant at the 5-percent
significance level. The results support the assumption that
civilian wage increases tend to reduce the supply of officers
for the Navy.
Although insignificant for each model, the estimates
for recruiters are positive for accessions (as shown in Table
10) and applications (as shown in Table 8), with the excep-
tion of model 2 (in column 2). However, Table 9 shows that
the coefficient of recruiters in the contracts model tends to
be negative. An explanation might be that recruiters affect
applications more than contracts because they cannot determine
which applicant will be selected. On the other hand, the
positive estimates for accessions reflect the recruiter
efforts devoted to those who signed a contract, to keep them
interested and to eventually join the Navy.
The coefficients for the military-available popula-
tion, entered either as a total or divided into race and
ethnic groups, are always positive and, in most cases,
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significant. This supports the assumption that the behavior
of 22-29 year olds is comparable to those in the 18-24 age
group.
To capture the unmeasured taste for the military,
dummy variables for each NRA are included in each model. The
base case is NRA1, the smallest recruiting Area. Tables 8
through 10 show that the coefficients for NRA3 are always
positive. NRA4 has some positive coefficients, and the
remaining NRAs have negative coefficients. This means that
recruiting for the Navy should be easier in Areas 3 and 4
(compared to NRA1) and more difficult in Areas 5, 7, and 8.
This result is reasonable. NRAs 3 and 4 are located along the
east coast, where the majority of naval bases are also
located. In addition, these Areas are densely populated.
The dummy variables for time trend show no unique
behavior across accessions, applications, and contracts. The
main trend for accession models is a turn from positive to
negative from 1987 to 1988, while applications and contracts
are primarily stable.
The estimated effect of the goal variable is posi-
tive, but always insignificant. Before these results are dis-
cussed, the estimates for college degrees are presented. This
is done because goals and college degrees are related, and
their influence on supply should be investigated together.
The estimates for earned degrees are positive and
insignificant for those models where degrees are divided by
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the available military population. They are negative but
significant at the 5-percent significance level for all other
models.
The assumption for recruiters, goals, and degrees is
that they all would be positive and significant. To see, how
the variables are related and influence each other, the simple
correlation matrices are investigated; and, in a second step,
the variables for recruiters and goals are omitted from those
models that include degrees. Tables 11 and 12 present the
correlation matrices for the regression models with and
without ratios. Tables 13 through 15 include the regression
equations, omitting recruiters and goals.
TABLE 11
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR MODELS
USING ACCESSION RATIOS
VARIABLES UNEMPL WA(E RECRS GOAL DEGREE
UNEMPL. 1.0000
WAGE -. 2259tt 1.0000
RECRS -. 1029 -. 3055 1.0000
GOAL .1033 -. 2819t .7787t 1.0000
DEGREE .0593 -. 1234 .4410t .3464t 1.0000
* Significant at the 5-percent significance level.
** Significant at the 10-percent significance level.
Both matrices show that goals are highly correlated
with recruiters. Data in Table 11 verify that officer
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recruiters tend to be placed in areas where college degrees
are higher. The correlation of recruiters and goals with
degrees, however, is negative (as shown in Table 12) and
fairly low.
TABLE 12
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR MODELS
USING ACCESSION LEVELS
VARIABLES UNEMPL WAGE RECRS GOAL DEGREE
UNEMPL 1.0000
WAGE -. 2259" 1.0000
RECRS -. 3628t .4649* 1.0000
GOAL .0613 .2105*1 .5152' 1.0000
DEGREE .0379 .0568 -. 0839 -. 0608 1.0000
* Significant at the 5-percent significance level.
** Significant at the 10-percent significance level.
Because of the correlation between recruiters, goals,
and degrees, if the first two variables are omitted, the
coefficient estimates for degrees should increase and become
positive. This assumption is supported by model 3 (column 3
in Tables 13-15), although degrees are still insignificant.
Moreover, the variable for unemployment becomes negative for
contracts and applications. Coefficient estimates for degrees
in models 1 and 2 change only slightly and remain negative.
Most dummy variables become positive for the reduced
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regression models. One explanation for the negative
coefficients for earned degrees is that while recruiters must
recruit from the college population, higher college population
do not necessarily translate into greater interest or
enlistment in the Navy. That is, the "take"' from any given
college market is so small that the population does not appear
to be closely associated with supply.
TABLE 13
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF
SUPPLY MODELS USING APPLICATIONSa
(OMITTING RECRUITERS AND GOALS)
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3
VARIABLE APPLICAT APPLICAT APPRATE•
CONSTANT -306.625 -62.750 .500
(-.572) (-.066) (5.697)
UNEMPL -. 465 -5.081 .00035
(-.017) (-.992) (.077)
WAGE -159. 187 -144.742 -. 043
(-2.705) (-1.752) (-5.250)
DEGREE -12.987 -13.453 .00045
(-1.506) (-2.469) (.578)
POP29 181.096 N/I N/I
(9.527)
BLK29 N/I 18.243 N/I
(2.025)
HSP29 N/I 8.352 N/I
(.999)




NRA3 -21.878 -22.722 -. 001
(-1.064) (-.774) (-.372)
NRA4 -38.099 -32.326 -. 006
(-1.506) (-1.202) (-1.498)
NRA5 -66.937 -62.577 -0.012
(-2.586) (-2.342) (-3.091)
NRA7 -109.324 -101.931 -0.021
(-3.822) (-2.607) (-4.499)
NRA8 -72.066 -50.379 -. 016
(-2.757) (-1.721) (-4.040)
YEAR87 -7.657 -8.744 -. 001
(-.616) (-.662) (-.548)
YEAR88 -56.490 -58.691 -. 008
(-4.012) (-3.918) (-3.473)
NUMBER OF OBS. 114 114 114
R2 - ADJUSTED .69 .65 .48
F-STATISTIC 24.059 17.334 11.404
a. T-statistic in parentheses.
b. Dependent variable and variable DEGREE are divided by
the military-available population.
N/I = not included.
TABLE 14
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF
SUPPLY MODELS USING CONTRACTS&
(OMITTING RECRUITERS AND GOALS)
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3.
VARIABLE CONTRACT CONTRACT CON A .
CONSTANT -45.973 152.017 .270
(-.143) (.267) (5.379)




WAGE -98.207 -91.837 -. 023
(-2.783) (-1.860) (-4.915)
DEGREE -9.287 -10.027 .000009
(-3.083) (-3.078) (.021)
POP29 102.263 N/I N/I
(8.971)
BLK29 N/I 7.693 N/I
(1.428)
HSP29 N/I 7.226 N/I
(1.451)
WH29 N/I 72.627 N/I
(4.240)
NRA3 -14.159 -13.005 -. 0002
(-1.148) (-.741) (-.129)
NRA4 -27.159 -23.929 -. 004
(-1.148) (-1.489) (-1.693)
NRA5 -47.393 -45.188 -0.008
(-3.238) (-2.829) (-3.568)
NRA7 -63.288 -62.693 -0.011
(-3.690) (-2.682) (-4.332)
NRA8 -44.842 -37.409 -. 009
(-2.860) (-2.138) (-3.916)
YEAR87 -30.489 -30.868 -. 004
(-4.091) (-3.912) (-3.709)
YEAR88 -52.801 -53.520 -. 007
(-6.253) (-5.978) (-5.728)
NUMBER OF OBS. 114 114 114
R4 - ADJUSTED .70 .68 .53
F-STATISTIC 25.300 18.445 13.997
a. T-statistic in parentheses.






SUPPLY MODELS USING ACCESSIONS'
(OMITTING RECRUITERS AND GOALS)
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3.
VARIABLE ACCESS ACCESS ACCRATEE
CONSTANT 97.907 373.969 .247
(.346) (.749) (5.579)
UNEMPL 3.255 2.137 .001
(.218) (.133) (.478)
WAGE -96.457 -98.634 -. 021
(-3.106) (-2.282) (-5.177)
DEGREE -7.002 -7.778 .00007
(-2.642) (-2.727) (.177)
POP29 85.138 N/I N/I
(8.487)
BLK29 N/I 7.020 Nii
(1.489)
HSP29 N/I 7.245 N/I
(1.662)
WH29 N/I 56.829 N/I
(3.789)
-NRA3 -9.165 -10.631 -. 0003
(-.844) (-.692) (-.184)
NRA4 -25.544 -22.209 -. 004
(-1.913) (-1.578) (-1.816)
NRA5 -41.205 -40.306 -0.007
(-3.200) (-2.882) (-3.519)
NRA7 -54.009 -57.218 -0.010
(-3.578) (-2.796) (-4.143)
NRA8 -31.837 -26.837 -. 007
(-2.308) (-1.752) (-3.399)




YEAR88 -46.226 -46.779 -. 007
(-6.221) (-5.967) (-5.703)
NUMBER OF OBS. 114 114 114
R2 - ADJUSTED .68 .65 .54
F-STATISTIC 23.017 16.958 14.217
a. T-statistic in parentheses.
b. Dependent variable and variable DEGREE are divided by
the military-available population.
N/I = noy included.
To summarize, none of the three variables discussed
above behaves as expected. The estimated coefficients of
recruiter and goals are positive, but tend to be insignifi-
cant, and the coefficients of degrees are just the reverse.
Omitting two explanatory variables that are highly correlated
to degrees does not affect the coefficients for degrees for
the majority of models, but it does change the coefficients
of the other variables.
There is no unique supply model that fits the total
number of applications, contracts, and accessions at the same
time. Applications and accessions can be estimated with the
same supply model. This model includes the military-available
population as an explanatory variable. Accessions can also
be estimated using the model in which the effect of population
data is determined separately for racial and ethnic origin.
The assumption that a model for applications would differ from
the one for contracts and accessions is not supported by
these results.
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The basic supply models are then estimated separately
for specific officer programs such as nuclear officers,
nurses, medical officers, and the entire medical corps. The
results are displayed in the Appen4ix.
Degrees are not only unequally distributed across the
NRDs, but some NRDs have no observation for a given occupa-
tional specialty. Therefore, the number of observations and
degrees of freedom for these regressions are reduced, and the
explanatory power of models tends to be poorer. The results
are worse than expected. None of the models has the correct
signs. However, an interesting result shown in the Appendix,
Tables 16-18, is that the coefficient estimates for degrees
become positive for nuclear officer supply models.
Because of the results, it is impossible to forecast
future officer supply for special officer programs on the
basis of the supply models presented here.
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOIOIENDATIONS
The objective of this thesis was to identify labor market,
economic, demographic, and geopolitical factors and trends,
that are believed to be important for officer accessions.
Based primarily on previous studies of enlisted manpower
supply, various factors are identified and incorporated in a
basic officer supply model.
The study specifies three different models of officer
supply. Three alternative dependent variables are used as
supply measures: applications, new contracts, and accessions.
It was hypothesized that applications would be a true measure
of supply, since contracts and accessions are demand-
constrained. The hypothesis that the model for applications
would differ from the other two models was rejected. How-
ever, the statistically significant variables have much
stronger effects on officer supply in the application models.
New contracts show incorrect estimates (signs) when the
variable for earned degrees is added to the model. Dale and
Gilroy [Ref. 15) argue that contracts are the correct
dependent variable to predict enlisted supply, because they
are determined by the need for new candidates. This is not
supported by the data used for this study of officers.
The labor market situation would be incorporated best if
youth unemployment data on county level were available.
Unfortunately, these data are not available--a pr4blem that
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has also plagued prior studies of enlisted supply. State
unemployment data are used instead. The unemployment variable
is never statistically significant in the models. This might
be partially the result of the data used. It can, however,
also be interpreted that the impact of unemployment on the
decision to join the Navy is smaller for college graduates
because, unlike high school graduates, they are less likely
to be unemployed.
The competition between private industry and the military
for the same high quality, but declining, youth population is
reflected through offered civilian wages, the number of
military recruiters, and the established officer recruiting
goals. Civilian wages are expected to influence the decision
to join the Navy negatively. The choice model (Eqn. 3.2)
"implies that nonmonetary military benefits must be
(subjectively) highly valued to compensate for higher civilian
wages and nonmonetary benefits. Wages are highly significant
for all models presented in Tables 8 through 10, an indicator
of increasing difficulties in recruiting. If military pay
stays constant, which in nominal terms is equivalent to a
decrease in relative pay, the military must offer substantial
nonmonetary benefits to be attractive to college graduates.
The decreasing defense budget will probably hamper any attempt
by the military in this direction, thus making future
recruiting more difficult.
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Although the wage variable behaves as expected in the
total supply models, follow-on research efforts should try to
incorporate more detailed wage data. Different data on wages
in health care, for example, are available through the Defense
Manpower Data Center.
'he results for recruiters and goals are of major
interest. They are never significant in any of the officer
supply models p.esented in Tables 8 through 10. When both
variables are omitted from the models, the dummy variables for
the individual NRAs become statistically significant in most
cas.s. It seems that the unmeasured tastes for the Navy
contribute more to the success of recruiters and their
productivity than do recruiters themselves. A better indica-
tor for the propensity of college graduates to join the
military would probably increase the explanatory power of the
supply models. Youth Attitude Tracking Study surveys could
be modified at relatively low cost to include college
attendees to provide data on officer enlistment propensity.
There is no satisfactory explanation for the negative
signs of the earned degrees variable. One might argue that
a better measure would be the number of enrolled college
students because those who graduate might move back to their
hometown~s before they join the military. However, recruit-
ers are placed in areas where colleges are located and
applications are primarily written during the time of college
enrollment. The numbers of graduates and college seniors
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differ probably only by a constant factor, and the number of
degrees is likely to be a close approximation of enrollments.
Thus, the models for applications presented in Table 8 should
have positive signs for degrees, but they do not. As the
number of earned degrees is of interest for officer supply,
further analysis of this variable and its contribution to
officer supply is warranted.
Will the steady decline of the youth population affect
college enrollments and thereby increase officer recruiting
problems? Harrington and Sum (Ref. 22:p. 20) show that,
despite all population projections, the number of high schcuol
graduates enrolled in college in the fall following their
graduation increased by 7.2 percent from 1982 to 1985. The
authors argue that the increased enrollments depend on the
growth of employment in private industry and increased
benefits for higher education from available job alterna-
tives. Harrington and Sum also show that the mean earnings
for college-educated men are higher compared to those without
college degrees. The difference in earnings jumped from 21
percent in 1973 to 57 percent in 1986. The same comparison
for college-educated women shows an increase by nearly 25
percent. (Ref. 22:pp. 20-21] If these trends continue, the
military available college graduate population should also
increase. However, future graduates may expect higher returns
than previous graduates from their future occupations.
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The situation for Hispanic graduates seems even better.
College enrollment after graduation from high school for this
group increased by 7.9 percent from 1982 to 1986, which is
above the increase in total enrollment. Therefore, their
chance to be recruited has increased, while college enroll-
ments for blacks increased by only 5.9 percent, making it
relatively harder for them to be recruited. [Ref. 22:p. 20]
Coefficient estimates for accessions (in Table 10, model 2,
column 2) support this assumption. Overall, however, due to
the decreasing defense budget, the military might not be able
to compete sufficiently for these college graduates in the
future.
Nonetheless, Uchitelle [Ref. 23] reports that recent
studies found an increasing surplus of college graduates.
While in prior years about 50 percent continued education
after graduating from high school, this proportion has risen
to almost 59 percent. Today, college graduates apply for jobs
usually occupied by high school graduates. In light of this
situation, officer recruiting--in general--might not become
so difficult in the future.
An unexpected finding in this thesis was the inadequate
results from estimating supply models for specific officer
occupational specialties. Some problems were anticipated as
a consequence of the unequal distribution of earned college
degrees. However, further studies are needed to examine the
behavior of the variables included in the models. This is
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particularly important because the models for nuclear of-
ficers are based on 112 observations, as Tables 16-18 show,
which is just two observations less than that used for the
entire officer supply models. Nevertheless, the estimated
nuclear officer models are not particularly robust.
In general, the data used for this thesis are applicable
to describe a supply model for the total number of
applications and accessions, but they are not adequate for a
detailed investigation of the supply for specific occupational
specialties. Furthermore, these data do not support the






SUPPLY MODELS FOR NUCLEAR OFFICERS
USING APPLICATIONS&
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3.
VARIABLE APPLICAT APPLICAT APPRATEb
CONSTANT 170.806 20.289 .039
(1.274) (.141) (2.580)
UNEMPL -5.789 -5.073 -. 00111
(-2.261) (-1.988) (-2.649)
WAGE -20.444 -7.408 -. 003
(-3.363) (-.982) (-2.688)
RECRS 2.074 1.853 .00002
(.270) (.246) (.014)
GOAL -7.526 -8.755 .0009
(-.238) (-.282) (.723)
DEGREE .242 .320 .00007
(.522) (.687) (.921)
POP29 5.688 N/I N/I
(3.298)
BLK29 N/I -1.063 N/I
(-1.389)
HSP29 N/I -1.200 N/I
(-1.795)
WH29 N1I 9.383 N/I
(4.023)
NRA3 -8.043 -3.253 -. 0005
(-.672) (-.272) (-1.189)
NRA4 -1.757 -1.932 .0006
(-.177) (-.198) (1.208)




NRA7 -9.957 -5.520 -. 0003
(-.536) (-.302) (-.696)
NRA8 -3.166 -. 749 .0003
(-.363) (-.087) (.610)
YEAR87 -. 695 .006 -. 0006
(-.081) (.001) (-2.173)
YEAR88 -1.450 -. 805 -. 0008
(-.170) (-.096) (-3.122)
NUMBER OF OBS. 112 112 112
R2 - ADJUSTED .32 .35 .31
F-STATISTIC 5.022 4.926 5.233
a. T-statistic in parentheses.
b. Dependent variable and variables RECRS, GOAL, and DEGREE
are divided by the military available population.
N/I = not included.
TABLE 17
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF
SUPPLY MODELS FOR NUCLEAR OFFICERS
USING CONTRACTS'
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3.
VARIABLE CONTRACT CONTRACT CONLtTb
CONSTANT 88.075 -53.059 .021
(.842) (-.454) (2.532)
UNEMPL -2.637 -1.979 -. 00049
(-1.320) (-1.009) (-1.435)
WAGE -14.523 -2.721 -. 002
(-3.064) (-.470) (-2.323)




GOALS -2.643 -3.751 -. 0004
(-.107) (-.158) (-.402)
DEGREE .171 .246 .00004
(.473) (.689) (.699)
POP29 4.565 N/I N/I
(3.406)
BLK29 N/I -1.008 N/I
(-1.714)
HSP29 N/I -1.135 NII
(-2.210)
WH29 N/I 8.130 N/I
(4.536)
NRA3 -2.586 1.750 -. 0003
(-.277) (.191) (-.942)
NRA4 1.013 .826 .0003
(.131) (.110) (.919)
NRA5 -4.201 -2.843 -. 0006
(-2.126) (-1.453) (-1.947)
NRA7 -2.984 1.050 -. 0004
(-.206) (.075) (-.915)
NRA8 -1.371 .772 .000008
(-.201) (.117) (.019)
YEAR87 -. 638 -. 001 -. 00006
(-.096) (-.000) (-.259)
YEAR88 -. 840 -. 247 -. 0002
(-.126) (-.039) (-.726)
NUMBER OF OBS. 112 112 112
RI - ADJUSTED .23 .28 .18
F-STATISTIC 3.590 3.935 3.058
a. T-statistic in parentheses.
b. Dependent variable and variables RECRS, GOAL, and DEGREE
are divided by the military available population.




SUPPLY MODELS FOR NUCLEAR OFFICERS
USING ACCESSIONS,
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3.
VARIABLE ACCEgs ACCESS ACCRATib
CONSTANT 75.434 -60.992 .020
(.708) (-.541) (2.323)
UNEMPL -3.031 -2.375 -. 0006
(-1.490) (-1.184) (-1.624)
WAGE -13.565 -1.836 -. 002
(-2.808) (-.310) (-2.158)
RECRS 5.132 4.926 .0007
(.841) (.832) (.707)
GOAL .312 -. 759 -. 00009
(.012) (-.031) (-.081)
DEGREE .195 .262 .00005
(.529) (.716) (.748)
POP29 4.217 N/I N/I
(3.088)
BLK29 N/I -1.046 N/I
(-1,739)
HSP29 N/I -1.109 N/I
(-2.111)
WH29 N/I 7.712 N/I
(4.206)
NRA3 -1.857 2.447 -. 0003
(-.195) (.261) (-.838)
NRA4 1.550 1.386 .0004
(.197) (.181) (.958)
NRA5 -3.340 -2.039 --. 0005
(-1.667) (-1.019) (-1.581)




NRA8 -. 291 1.810 .0001
(-.042) (.268) (.256)
YEAR87 -1.270 -. 650 -. 0001
(-.187) (-.098) (-.555)
YEAR88 -1.210 -. 634 -. 0002
(-.179) (-.096) (-.841)
NUMBER OF OBS. 112 112 112
R2 - ADJUSTED .21 .26 .19
F-STATISTIC 3.337 3.622 3.109
a. T-statistic in parentheses.
b. Dependent variable and variables RECRS, GOAL, and DEGREE
are divided by the military available population.
N/I = not included.
TABLE 19
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF
SUPPLY MODEL FOR THE NURSE CORPS
USING APPLICATIONS
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3.
VARIABLE APPLICAT APP-TIC• APP-RATT
CONSTANT 45.653 8.310 .037
(.846) (.076) (3.689)
UNEMPL -3.231 -3.578 .0001
(-.495) (-.520) (.169)
WAGE -15.006 -10.153 -. 003
(-2.479) (-1.114) (-3.412)
RECRS -3.182 -3.282 -. 00008
(-1.336) (-1.313) (-.242)
GOAL -1.664 -1.663 -. 0002
(-1.106) (-1.052) (-.723)




POP29 11.763 N/I N/I
(4.647)
BLK29 N/I 1.705 N/I
(1.492)
HSP29 N/I -. 582 N/I
(-.382)
WH29 N/I 10.029 N/I
(2.776)
NRA3 -11.175 -10.642 -. 0009
(-2.314) (-1.952) (-1.667)
NRA4 -11.506 -10.569 -. 002
(-3.791) (-3.135) (-3.251)
NRA5 -15.610 -13.880 -.002
(-4.828) (-3.325) (-4.439)
YEAR87 -3.314 -3.585 -. 0009
(-1.040) (-1.068) (-1.497)
YEAR88 -6.115 -6.572 -. 001
(-2.262) (-2.313) (-2.036)
NUMBER OF OBS. 59 59 59
R2 - ADJUSTED .54 .49 .44
F-STATISTIC 7.146 5.317 5.691
a. T-statistic in parentheses.
b. Dependent variable and variables RECRS, GOAL, and DEGREE
are divided by the military available population.




SUPPLY MODELS FOR TEE NURSE CORPS
USING CONTRACTS'
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3.
VARIABLE CONTRACT CONTRACT CONRATib
CONSTANT 25.465 -4.422 .029
(.484) (-.041) (3.018)
UNEMPL -4.668 -5.040 -. 0002
(-.734) (-.753) (-.184)
WAGE -11.143 -6.984 -.003
(-1.889) (-.787) (-2.800)
RECRS -3.079 -3.186 .0001
(-1.335) (-1.310) (-.418)
GOAL -1.345 -1.345 -. 0001
(-.917) (-.874) (-.423)
DEGREE -2.736 -2.572 -. 0001
(-1.288) (-1.081) (-.483)
POP29 10.336 N/I N/1
(4.189)
BLK29 N/I 1.447 N/IX
(1.302)
HSP29 N/I -. 461 N/I
(-.311)
WH29 N/I 8.714 N/I
(2.479)
NRA3 -9.993 -9.611 -. 0008
(-2.123) (-1.811) (-1.520)
NRA4 -9.307 -8.528 -. 001
(-3.146) (-2.600) (-2.620)
NRAS -13.183 -11.748 -. 002
(-4.184) (-2.892) (-3.882)




YEAR88 -4.464 -4.875 -. 0006
(-1.694) (-1.763) (-1.377)
NUMBER OF OBS. 59 59 59
R2 - ADJUSTED .43 .38 .32
F-STATISTIC 4.991 3.683 3.776
a. T-statistic in parentheses.
b. Dependent variable and variables RECRS, GOAL, and DEGREE
are divided by the military available population.
N/I = not included.
TABLE 21
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF
SUPPLY MODELS FOR THE NURSE CORPS
USING ACCESSIONS'
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3.
VARIABLE ACCESS ACCESS &CCRATib
CONSTANT 28.029 42.172 .026
(.599) (.443) (3.001)
UNEHPL -4.919 -5.592 -. 0006
(-.869) (-.938) (-.729)
WAGE -10.850 -10.029 -. 002
(-2.066) (-1.270) (-2.798)
RECRS -1.683 -1.785 -. 00007
(-.814) (-.824) (-.229)
GOAL -1.057 -1.089 -. 00008
(-.810) (-.795) (-.376)
DEGREE -2.336 -2.468 -. 0002
(-1.236) (-1.165) (-.800)




BLK29 N/I 1.191 N/I
(1.203)
HSP29 N/I .214 N/I
(.162)
WH29 N/I 6.662 N/I
(2.128)
NRA3 -5.669 -6.169 -. 0004
(-1.353) (-1.306) (-.920)
NRA4 -5.470 -5.113 -.0008
(-2.071) (-1.750) (-1.698)
NRA5 -9.296 -8.944 -. 002
(-3.314) (-2.472) (-3.268)
YEAR87 -2.329 -2.393 -. 0005
(-.843) (-.822) (-.925)
YEAR88 -3.580 -3.325 -. 0005
(-1.527) (-1.553) (-1.265)
NUMBER OF OBS. 59 59 59
F - ADJUSTED .34 .27 .27
F-STATISTIC 3.696 2.680 3.141
a. T-statistic in parentheses.
b. Dependent variable and variables RECRS, GOAL, and DEGREE





SUPPLY MODEL FOR MEDICAL OFFICERS
USING APPLICATIONS'
MODEJ 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3.
VARIABLE APPLICAT APPLICAT UPPRT
CONSTANT -9.833 -360.641 -. 002
(-.174) (-2.906) (-.224)
UNEMPL -5.309 -2.860 -. 0007
(-1.720) (-.979) (-1.497)
WAGE 1.423 24.776 .0004
(.384) (3.021) (.061)
RECRS -2.479 -1.945 -. 00002
(-.788) (-.697) (-.032)
GOAL -5.582 -1.77" .0005
(-.775) (-.272) (.688)
DEGREE -3.574 -1.192 -. 0005
(-1.843) (-.611) - (-1.819)
POP29 4.707 N/I N/I
(1.614)
BLK29 N/I 1.239 N/I
(1.567)
HSP29 N/I -4.322 N/I
(-3.047)
WH29 N/I 13.434 N/I
(3.423)
NRA3 -7.577 2.136 -. 0001
(-1.282) (.346) (-.377)
NRA4 -5.489 -1.232 -. 0004
(-1.459) (-.329) (-1.045)
NRA5 -5.551 3.001 -. 0004
(-1.267) (.610) (-.860)




YEAR87 -3.910 -5.186 -. 0006
(-3.407) (-4.743) (-3.389)
YEAR88 1.159 -2.568 -. 0006
(.241) (-.581) (-1.006)
NUMBER OF OBS. 40 40 40
R2 - ADJUSTED .28 .44 .29
F-STATISTIC 2.266 3.154 2.463
a. T-statistic in parentheses.
b. Dependent variable and variables RECRS, GOAL, and DEGREE
are divided by the military available population.
Nil = not included.
TABLE 23
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF
SUPPLY MODELS FOR MEDICAL OFFICERS
USING CONTRACTS&
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3
VARIABLE CONTRACT CONTRACT CONRATEb
CONSTANT -52.416 -309.702 -°004
(-1.125) (-2.866) (-.777)
UNEMPL -2.462 -. 810 -. 0005
(-.965) (-.319) (-1.270)
WAGE 1.820 19.941 .0004
(.594) (2.792) (.790)
RECRS 1.115 1.487 .0002
(.429) (.612) (.605)
GOAL -1.280 1.508 .00008(-.215) (.266) (.149)
DEGREE -1.072 .349 -. 0003
(-.669) (.205) (-1.322)




BLK29 N/I .699 N/I
(1.028)
HSP29 N/I -3.215 N/I
(-2.603)
WH29 N/I 10.019 N/I
(2.931)
NRA3 -1.354 5.429 -. 0001
(-.277) (1.010) (-.587)
NRA4 -1.337 1.293 -. 0003
(-.430) (.397) (-.779)
NRA5 -. 065 5.533 -. 0001
(-.018) (1.292) (-.291)
NRA8 -6.259 -3.539 -. 0004
(-2.034) (-1.179) (-.836)
YEAR87 -1.930 -2.959 -. 0003
(-2.034) (-3.108) (-2.084)
YEAR88 -. 841 -3.702 -. 0003
(-.212) (-.962) (-.694)
NUMBER OF OBS. 40 40 40
R2 - ADJUSTED .13 .24 .12
F-STATISTIC 1.493 1.904 1.483
a. T-statistic in parentheses.
b. Dependent variable and variables RECRS, GOAL, and DEGREE
are divided by the military available population.




SUPPLY MODELS FOR MEDICAL OFFICERS
USING ACCESSIONS'
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3.
VARIABLE ACCESS ACCESS ACCRAT
CONSTANT -18.904 -220.922 -. 004
(-.479) (-2.424) (-.910)
UNEHPL -. 736 .714 -. 00003
(-.341) (.333) (-.083)
WAGE 1.616 16.313 .0003
(.624) (2.708) (.781)
RECRS 1.238 1.546 .0003
(.563) (.754) (.898)
GOAL -3.799 -1.516 .00004
(-.753) (-.317) (.076)
DEGREE -1.094 -. 339 -. 0002
(-.807) (-.237) (-1.104)
POP29 1.804 N/I N/I
(.884)
BLK29 N/I .011 N/I
(.019)
HSP29 N/I -2.492 N/I
(-2.392)
WH29 N/I 6.785 N/I
(2.354)
NRA3 -2.765 2.389 -. 00006
(-.668) (.527) (-.274)
NRA4 -2.437 -1.126 -. 0003
(-.925) (-.409) (-1.005)
NRA5 -. 802 2.584 -. 00001
(-.262) (-1.644) (-.033)




YEAR87 -2.116 -2.933 -. 0003
(-2.635) (-3.653) (-2.601)
YEAR88 1.512 -. 787 -. 0002
(.450) (-.242) (-.370)
NUMBER OF OES. 40 40 40
R2 - ADJUSTED .15 .27 .16
F-STATISTIC 1.573 2.010 1.682
a. T-statistic in parentheses.
b. Dependent variable and variables RECRS, GOAL, and DEGREE
are divided by the military available population.
N/I = not included.
TABLE 25
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF
SUPPLY MODELS FOR THE MEDICAL CORPS
USING APPLICATIONS'
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3.
VARIABLE hPPLICAT APPLICAT APPRATib
CONSTANT 50.213 -9.084 .058
(.558) (-.071) (3.499)
UNEMPL -1.189 .056 .00002
(-.211) (.009) (.020)
WAGE -22.100 -14.679 -. 005
(-2.681) (-1.474) (-2.986)
RECRS -5.772 -5.770 -. 0003
(-1.056) (-1.009) (-.295)
GOAL -1.157 -. 649 .0009
(-.195) (-.104) (.973)
DEGREE -3.253 -3.460 -. 00004
(-1.899) (-1.574) (-1.112)




BLK29 N/I .348 N/I
(.264)
HSP29 N/I -. 154 N/I
(-.122)
WH29 N/I 18.029 N/I
(3.733)
NRA3 -9.762 -7.275 -. 0002
(-1.745) (-1.127) (-.226)
NRA4 -10.460 -10.497 -.001
(-2.073) (-1.946) (-1.437)
NRA5 -16.803 -15.373 -. 003
(-3.495) (-2.880) (-2.857)
NRA7 -23.727 -19.196 -. 003
(-3.769) (-2.442) (-3.005)
NRA8 -26.255 -22.355 -. 002
(-3.778) (-3.046) (-1.582)
YEAR87 -15.395 -15.373 -. 002
(-3.575) (-3.407) (-2.192)
YEAR88 -10.018 -10.053 -. 001
(-3.435) (-3.266) (-2.808)
NUMBER OF OBS. 84 84 84
R2 - ADJUSTED .54 .50 .52
F-STATISTIC 8.603 6.537 8.445
a. T-statistic in parentheses.
b. Dependent variable and variables RECRS, GOAL, and DEGREE
are divided by the military available population.




SUPPLY MODELS FOR THE MEDICAL CORPS
USING CONTRACTS'
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3.
VARIABLE CONTRACT CONTRACT CONRATb
CONSTANT -19.922 -103.365 .026
(-.257) (-.950) (1.951)
UNEMPL 1.288 .433 -. 00005
(-.265) (.083) (-.060)
WAGE -10.688 -2.963 -. 003
(-1.508) (-.350) (-1.928)
RECRS -5.074 -5.038 -. 0002
(-1.080) (1.037) (-.296)
GOAL -1.648 -1.100 .0003
(-.323) (-.208) (.432)
DEGREE -2.903 -2.714 -. 0004
(-1.971) (-1.455) (-1.345)
PoP29 15.169 N/I N/I
(5.080)
BLK29 N/I .200 N/I
(.178)
HSP29 N/I -. 690 N/I
(-.642)
WH29 N/I 15.667 NII
(3.820)
NRA3 -9.302 -6.188 -. 0006
(-1.933) (-1.116) (-.815)
NRA4 -10.129 -9.949 -. 001
(-2.334) (-2.172) (-2.006)
NRA5 -14.163 -12.555 -. 002
(-3.426) (-2.697) (-3.059)




NRA8 -29.164 -25.700 -. 003
(-4.881) (-4.123) (-2.538)
YEAR87 -11.063 -10.962 -. 001
(-2.988) (-2.861) (-2.503)
YEAR88 -7.108 -6.998 -. 0008
(-2.834) (-2.677) (-2.151)
NUMBER OF OBS. 84 84 84
-2 AD3•STED .45 .41 .39
F-STATISTIC 6.176 4.847 5.462
a. T-statistic in parentheses.
b. Dependent variable and variables RECRS, GOAL, and DEGREE
are divided by the military available population.
N/I = not included.
TABLE 27
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF
SUPPLY MODELS FOR THE MEDICAL CORPS
USING ACCESSIONS
MODEL 1. MODEL 2. MODEL 3.
VARIABLE ACCESS AC-ESS ACCRATb
CONSTANT -18.765 -80.832 .021
(-.299) (-.916) (1.873)
UNEMPL -1.373 -. 153 -. 0002
(-.349) (-.036) (-.227)
WAGE -8,803 -2.793 -. 002
(-1.533) (-.407) (-1.896)
RECRS -3.629 -3.610 -. 0002
(-.953) (-.916) (-.254)
GOAL -1.574 -1.150 .0003
(-.381) (-.269) (.413)




POP29 12.726 N/I H/I
(5.261)
BLK29 N/I .174 N/1
(.191)
HSP29 N/I -. 428 N/I
(-.492)
WH29 N/I 12.899 N/I
(3.879)
SNRA3 -6.326 -3.944 -. 0004
(-1.623) (-.887) (-.629)
NRA4 -7.459 -7.376 -. 001
(-2.122) (-1.985) (-1.765)
NRA5 -10.633 -9.528 -. 002
(-3.175) (-2.524) (-2.867)
NRA7 -13.635 -9.498 -. 002
(-3.110) (-1.755) (-2.655)
NRA8 -22.51i9 -19.903 -. 002
(-4.663) (-3.938) (-2.287)
YEAR87 -9.143 -9.081 -. 001
(-3.048) (-2.923) (-2.522)
YEAR88 -5.599 -5.547 -. 0007
(-2.756) (-2.617) (-2.130)
NUMBER OF OBS. 84 84 84
R2 - ADJUSTED .44 .40 .37
P-STATISTIC 5.983 4.672 5.064
a. T-statistic in parentheses.
b. Dependent variable and variables RECRS, GOAL, and DEGREE
are divided by the military available population.
N/I = not included.
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